

SEPARATION BARRIER ON AFFECTED WEST BANK COMMUNITIES¹

SUMMARY

1. Motivated by concerns that Palestinian livelihoods and the viability of local economies could be harmed by the construction of a separation barrier and that the barrier might negatively impact the delivery of humanitarian aid and damage assistance projects, the international donor community through the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC) commissioned a study of the possible socio-economic impact of the barrier on affected Palestinian communities. That study², carried out at the request and under the direction of a Steering Group composed of members of the donor Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (the European Union Presidency (HEPG chair), the European Commission, the Government of Norway, the US Government, UNSCO, and the World Bank), plus the International Monetary Fund, was released on May 4, 2003 and focused on the impact of the initial 126 km of Phase I construction (officially launched on June 16, 2002) running south from Salem Checkpoint through Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqiliya, and Salfit Governorates to the Israeli settlement of Elkana, and the additional 21 km of construction to the north and south of Jerusalem. The completion of Phase I construction was announced by the Ministry of Defence on July 31, 2003.

2. Phase II construction, initiated in January 2003, runs along the northern edge of Jenin Government from Salem eastward to Gilboa and the Beit She'an Valley, approximately 45 km. Works currently extend just past the Palestinian village of Jalbun. The areas of Phase II construction, along with northernmost 5 km of Phase I, are the primary subject of this follow-up report.³

3. Beyond Jalbun the barrier's future alignment is uncertain.⁴ IDF maps obtained by OCHA show a projected path extending 12 km southward into the Jordan Valley to the village of Taysir (located 3 km northeast of Tubas and

¹ A Follow_up report to the Humanitarian And Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) And The Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC), Update Number 1, July 31, 2003, which includes three sections: "Economic Impact of the Barrier on Affected Communities" (page 7), principal author, World Bank; "Impact of the Barrier all on Population Migration" (page 15), principal author, UNSCO; and "The Israeli Debate over the Separation Fence" (page 20), principal author, British Embassy, Tel Aviv.

² "The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities" is available at the following web address: <http://www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/docs/HEPG/Wallreport.pdf>. Annex I (Economic Impact), Annex II (Social Impact), Annex III (Impact on Water Management), and maps are available at: http://www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/docs/HEPG/Wall_Annexes.zip

³ In July, a team consisting of World Bank and UNSCO staff members visited the following Jenin villages located along the barrier's alignment: 'Anin, At Tayba, Rummana, Zububa, Al Jalama, 'Arabbuna, Faqu'a, and Jalbun. Discussions were held with municipal leaders, local businessmen, and farmers in each village. These areas were selected because Phase II work was not sufficiently advanced at the time of the May report to be reviewed without excessive speculation as to the barrier's alignment and impact. The final 5 km of Phase I, now completed, were thought an appropriate area in which to focus on migration issues that might have resulted from the barrier.

⁴ Knesset members also complain of not being informed. In late July, MK Michael Eitan (Likud) initiated a postponement of Knesset Finance Committee consideration of a transfer of NIS 750 million (approx. US\$175 million) for fence construction pending a Likud faction discussion, saying, "No one told us its route, whether the fence was compatible with the road map policy and whether there is a need for such an expensive fence. None of us know a thing, including the minister. They change the route and don't tell anyone." At the July 21 faction meeting, Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed that contractors have already been promised the sum, despite the fact the financing has not been formally approved. Gideon Allon, "Likud to Support allocating NIS 750 million for Security Fence," *Ha'aretz*, July 21, 2003.

approximately 10 km west of the Israeli settlements at Mahola and Rotm, which are 4 km west of the Jordan River), possible evidence of a second “eastern barrier” reportedly under consideration (although not yet approved nor budgeted). This structure, if built, would situate other settlements “outside” the barrier system and would in the process sever Palestinian population concentrations in the West Bank from the Jordan Valley.⁵

4. Likewise, other future sections of the barrier – northwest of Jerusalem to Elkana, east of Jerusalem, and along the central and southern portions of the “seam area” separating the West Bank from Israel – remain under discussion, complicated by the number of large settlement blocs surrounding Jerusalem and south of Hebron.

5. Whereas Phase I of the barrier’s alignment did not coincide with the Green Line (in some places extending as much as six kilometers inside the West Bank, as a result of which some 12,000 Palestinians in fifteen villages and hamlets now find themselves on the western, Israel-facing side of the barrier), Phase II’s alignment more closely adheres to the Green Line, although still built within the West Bank. Consequently, the prospect of physical separation and isolation in northern Jenin Governorate, with inhabitants effectively cut off from West Bank workplaces, agricultural lands, irrigation networks, water resources, and/or schools, health clinics and other social services, is much less than in the affected areas near Tulkarm and Qalqiliya of Phase I. This is not to minimize the economic loss to individual landowners who have seen their lands requisitioned for the barrier’s alignment.

6. For these individuals, access to agricultural lands now located on the other side of the barrier remains critical. While OCHA has identified 14 “agricultural crossings,” described mostly as “uncontrolled gaps in the wall”⁶ throughout Phase I of the barrier, construction along Phase II has not advanced to the stage that such crossings are apparent (should they even be under consideration).⁷

7. However, the primary economic affect of the barrier in this area stems from the now complete elimination of employment prospects for West Bank Palestinians in Israel, and the limitations imposed by Israeli closure policies on the ability of Israeli Arab customers to frequent Palestinian commercial

⁵ “The Defense Ministry has completed two alignments of the fence – a western one parallel to the seam line and an eastern one, severing Palestinian population concentrations in the West Bank from the Jordan Valley... Sharon spoke of the importance of the eastern fence on a tour with cabinet ministers along the seam line last week... The eastern fence is planned along the mountain slopes, along the ‘Alon axis’ from Mehola to Ma’aleh Adumim and from there to the Judaeen Desert. The fence will leave two Palestinian enclaves which may come under Palestinian rule in the future.” Aluf Benn, “Defense Ministry Wants Fence Moved Deeper Into West Bank,” *Ha’aretz*, March 23, 2003.

⁶ OCHA, “The West Bank Wall, Humanitarian Status Report: Northern West Bank Trajectory,” July 2003, p. 9. The report can be found at <http://www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/wall.htm>

⁷ During preparations for Phase I construction, the State Attorney’s Office stated that “reasonable crossing arrangements will be made that will take into account the need for the movement of laborers and suitable work implements, on the one hand, and the ability to transport the produce from the farmland to villages lying east of the barrier, on the other hand.” Response of the Israeli State Attorney to the High Court of Justice in HCJ 7784/02, Sa’al ‘Awani ‘Abd al Hadi et al. v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, sec. 35, as cited in B’Tselem-The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, “The Separation Barrier: Update”, October 2002, p.2 and B’Tselem, “Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of Israel’s Separation Barrier”, Position Paper, April 2003, p. 12.

establishments, particularly in Al Jalama, but other communities, including Jenin city.

Affected Communities: Jenin Governorate

8. Phase I construction of the barrier created an enclave consisting of six villages located between the barrier and the Green Line, with a total estimated population in 2003 of approx. 4,300.

Table 2: Phase I Construction and the Isolation of Jenin Communities: Six Villages Located West of the Barrier and East of the Green Line

1. Umm ar Rihan	010085	353
2. Khirbet 'Abdallah al Yunis	010105	133
3. Dhaher al Malih	010115	205
4. Barta'a ash Sharqiya	010120	3,404
5. Khirbet ash Sheikh Sa'eed	010130	206
6. Khirbet al Muntar al Gharbiya	010175	n.a.
Total		4,301

Source: Mid-2003 PCBS population projections based on 1997 Census. PCBS does not produce population projections for communities with populations below 100 as reported in the 1997 Census. The World Bank, in preparing the report "Poverty in the West Bank and Gaza" (June 18, 2001), placed the end-1997 population of Kirbet al Muntar al Gharbiya at 26.

9. In addition to the six communities isolated between the barrier and the Green Line, land has been lost to another nine villages, with a combined population of some 12,500, as a result of Phase II construction.

Table 2: Phase I Construction and the Isolation of Jenin Communities: Nine Villages Located East of the Barrier Losing Land

Locality	Census Code	2003 Population
1. Rummana	10010	3,186
2. At Tayba	10020	2,254
3. 'Anin	10045	3,514
4. 'Arab al Hamdun	10090	n.a.
5. Al 'Araqa	10125	2,007
6. Tura al Gharbiya	10145	1,048
7. Tura ash Sharqiya	10150	171
8. Khirbet al Muntar ash Sharqiya	10205	n.a.
9. Dhaher al 'Abed	10240	351
Total		12,531

Source: Mid-2003 PCBS population projections based on 1997 Census. PCBS does not produce population projections for communities with populations below 100 as reported in the 1997 Census. The World Bank, in

preparing the report "Poverty in the West Bank and Gaza" (June 18, 2001), placed the end-1997 population of 'Arab al Hamdun at 40 and of Kirbet al Muntar ash Sharqiya at 13.

10. On the basis of military maps obtained by OCHA, two other groups of communities in northwest Jenin Governorate appear threatened by land requisitioning or restricted access through "depth barriers" or secondary sets of barriers.⁸

**Table 3: Phase I Construction and the Isolation of Northwestern Jenin Communities:
Villages Located East of the Barrier and Threatened by Secondary Barriers**

Locality	Census Code	2003 Population
1. Ti'innik	10015	1,035
1. Silat al Harithiya	10035	9,297
2. As Sa'aida	10040	n.a.
3. Khirbet Suruj	10070	n.a.
Total		10,332

Source: Mid-2003 PCBS population projections based on 1997 Census. PCBS does not produce population projections for communities with populations below 100 as reported in the 1997 Census. The World Bank, in preparing the report "Poverty in the West Bank and Gaza" (June 18, 2001), placed the end-1997 population of As Sa'aida at 97 and of Kirbet Suruj at 36.

11. Of these, some would be affected by a potential modification of the existing (and constructed) Phase I alignment which would place the Israeli settlements of Hemesh and Mevo Dotah west of the barrier. This modification, shown on IDF maps obtained by OCHA, would extend approx 12 km into the West Bank, placing 8 Palestinian communities with nearly 17,000 population in an enclave with limited access.

**Table 4: Phase I Construction and the Isolation of Northwestern Jenin Communities:
Villages Located East of the Barrier and Threatened by Additional Secondary Barriers
To Incorporate Israeli Settlements on the Western Side**

Locality	Census Code	2003 Population
1. Nazlat ash Sheikh Zeid	10165	689
1. At Tarem	10170	376
2. Khirbet Mas'ud	10200	n.a.
3. Umm Dar	10225	551
4. Al Khuljan	10230	460
5. Zabda	10245	785
6. Ya'bad	10265	13,633
7. Imreiha	10285	403
Total		16,897

Source: Mid-2003 PCBS population projections based on 1997 Census. PCBS does not produce

⁸ In addition to communities separated from the remaining West Bank (identified in Table 1), "affected" communities are deemed to be those losing municipal lands for the barrier's construction, lying within 1.5 km of the barrier, or having a major (or principal) access road bisected by the barrier's alignment.

population projections for communities with populations below 100 as reported in the 1997 Census. The World Bank, in preparing the report "Poverty in the West Bank and Gaza" (June 18, 2001), placed the end-1997 population of Khirbet Mas'ud at 47.

12. Phase II construction, running along the north of Jenin Governorate, has directly impacted five communities through land requisitioning, and on the basis of IDF maps a sixth community (Al Mutilla) will be similarly affected. Three other communities would be impacted because of their proximity to the barrier ('Arrana, Khirbet Abu Anqar, and Umm Qabub).

**Table 5: Phase II Construction and the Isolation of Northern Jenin Communities:
Nine Villages Located South of the Barrier**

Locality	Census Code	2003 Population
1. Zububa	10005	2,007
2. Al Jalama	10030	2,177
3. 'Arabbuna	10025	808
4. Faqqu'a	10060	3,297
5. Jalbun	10190	2,355
6. Al Mutilla	10315	248
7. 'Arrana	10050	2,026
8. Khirbet Abu 'Anqar	10065	n.a.
9. Umm Qabub	10160	n.a.
Total		12,918

Source: Mid-2003 PCBS population projections based on 1997 Census. PCBS does not produce population projections for communities with populations below 100 as reported in the 1997 Census. The World Bank, in preparing the report "Poverty in the West Bank and Gaza" (June 18, 2001), placed the end-1997 population of Khirbet Abu 'Anqar at 11 and Umm Qahub at 71.

13. In summary, 36 communities in Jenin Governorate, home to 23 percent of the overnorate's population, are likely to be impacted by the construction of the barrier. Even if the modifications to Phase I are not carried out, 24 communities with 30,000 persons will have lost lands in its construction.

Table 6: Summary of Affected Communities in Jenin Governorate

Locality Cluster	No. Communities	2003 Population
Phase I: Communities between the Barrier and the Green Line	6	4,301
Phase I: Communities West of the Barrier and Losing Land for its Construction	9	12,531
Phase I: Communities West of the Barrier and Threatened by Secondary Barriers	4	10,332
Phase I: Communities Threatened by Route Modification to Incorporate Settlements	8	16,897
Phase II: Communities South of the Barrier and Losing Land for its	6	10,892

Construction		
Phase II: Other Affected Communities South of the Barrier	3	2,026
Total Affected Communities	36	56,979
Total Communities, Jenin Governorate	96	247,305
Total	37.5%	23.0%

The Economic Impact of the Barrier on Affected Communities

14. As noted in the May report, Palestinian villages and towns located on or near the Green Line generally fared better in economic terms prior to the *Intifada* than communities in the same governorates situated in the interior. Several factors gave the border communities distinct advantages and greater income-earning opportunities. First, they had easier access to the Israeli labor market. Second, the relatively porous border allowed manufacturers, farmers, and merchants from border areas to penetrate the wealthier Israeli consumer market. Third, large numbers of Israelis, both Jews and Moslems – regularly frequented the border towns to purchase lower-cost goods and services, boosting commercial and service incomes. Fourth, the population of the three governorates in the north and northwest (Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqiliya) possessed greater stocks of agricultural assets (in particular, land and livestock), and relatively more abundant water resources, in particular irrigation networks, compared to other West Bank areas.

15. This relative prosperity was described in a 2001 World Bank study on poverty in the West Bank and Gaza⁹ that developed a “poverty map” – a geographical profile of poverty in the Palestinian territories. On the basis of Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Surveys for 1996, 1997, and 1998, the key determinants of household consumption were identified. Among the key findings were the following: (i) households with at least one working member are less likely to be poor – underscoring the importance of employment for poverty reduction; (ii) if a household member is employed in Israel, the household is better off than if he or she works in the Palestinian territories; (iii) in the West Bank, households with members employed in the private sector are better off than those with members working in the public sector; and (iv) the higher the educational level, the higher the household consumption (and less likely for the household to fall into poverty.)

16. In order to identify the geographical distribution of poverty over a large number of locations a large data set is required. The 1997 Population Census, while comprehensive, does not include the household consumption information that would be necessary to directly identify the poor. However, by utilizing the 1997 Expenditure and Consumption Survey to identify the correlates of poverty, poverty rates can be calculated for any census-area.¹⁰ The poverty rate for Jenin Governorate in 1997 was estimated at 30.2 percent

⁹ World Bank, “Poverty in the West Bank and Gaza”, 2001

¹⁰ The analysis was conducted by applying a two-step procedure. First, through regression analysis, the determinants of poverty were identified, under the restriction that the set of explanatory values were those included in both the Household Surveys and the Census. Next, the parameter estimates obtained from the regression analysis were combined with the average values of the explanatory variables for each locality obtained from the Census, in order to predict the poverty rate in each area. Because these are predicted values and not actual observations, the level of accuracy is lower. Although point estimates are presented in paragraph 16 and table 7, these should be viewed as only indicative of the poverty rates for that geographical area.

(23.8 percent in urban areas, 25.2 percent in refugee camps, and 35.2 percent in rural areas).¹¹

17. The World Bank study showed considerable variability in poverty rates between West Bank areas (and among localities within areas). This is true of the six areas impacted by Phase I and Phase II construction of the barrier identified in Table 6 above.

Table 7 presents the poverty rates for these clusters, as well as for other areas of Jenin Governorate. Within the affected areas, some of the lowest rates are in At-Taybe (21.7 percent), which benefited from close proximity and strong familial ties with the Israeli Arab village of Umm Al-Fahm; Al Jalama (19.0 percent), a commercial center for Israeli shoppers in the north of Jenin; and Ya'bad (23.7 percent) and Silat al Harithiya (17.6 percent), the two largest affected communities. The highest rates were all recorded in small, relatively remote villages; the only villages with less than 100 persons and poverty rates below 30 percent were found in the area now located between the Green Line and the barrier, evidence of the benefit the close proximity to Israeli labor markets afforded these residents. (The World Bank analysis for the West Bank and Gaza overall confirmed that living in a village, and to a larger extent, in a refugee camp, increases the probability of being poor.)¹²

Table 7: Estimated Poverty Rates for Affected Communities in Jenin Governorate, 1997

Locality Cluster	Estimated Poverty			population	
	Number	Rate	Share of Jenin	Number	Share of Jenin
Phase I: Communities between the Barrier and the Green Line	894	25.3 %	1.5 %	3,537	1.8 %
Phase I: Communities West of the Barrier and Losing Land for its Construction	2,913	28.3 %	4.8 %	10,298	5.1 %
Phase I: Communities West of the Barrier and Threatened by Secondary Barriers	1,629	19.0 %	2.7 %	8,558	4.2 %
Phase I: Communities Threatened by Route Modification to Incorporate Settlements	3,750	27.1 %	6.1 %	13,848	6.9 %
Phase II: Communities South of the Barrier and Losing Land for its Construction	2,709	30.4 %	4.4 %	8,905	4.4 %
Phase II: Other Affected Communities South of the Barrier	453	26.1 %	0.7 %	1,738	0.9 %
Total Affected Communities	12,347	26.3 %	20.2 %	46,884	23.2 %
"Unaffected" Urban	18,899	23.8 %	30.9 %	79,296	39.2 %

¹¹ The poverty line used was that developed by the National Commission for Poverty Alleviation's *Palestine Poverty Report 1998* – NIS 1460 per month for a benchmark household of two adults and four children, equivalent to US\$767 annually per person or US\$2.1 per day. For a full description of the methodology employed, see National Commission for Poverty Alleviation, *Palestine Poverty Report 1998*.

¹² The analysis also confirmed the relationship between educational levels and employment status of the head of household: a higher educational level reduces the probability of being poor as does working, particularly in Israel. Other information from the Census that were useful predictors of poverty was ownership of durable goods – telephone, television, refrigerator, stove – and housing quality (e.g., heating system). While these variables cannot be interpreted as economic determinants of poverty, they are indications of the level of income of the household. When statistically correlated with poverty, they become useful in identifying the poor.

Communities					
“Unaffected” Refugee Camps	2,380	25.2 %	3.9 %	9,444	4.7 %
“Unaffected” Rural Communities	27,482	41.4 %	45.0 %	66,411	32.9 %
Total, Jenin Governorate	61,108	37.5%	100.0%	202,035	100.0 %

Note: Population estimates are end-1997, reflecting ex-post adjustments by PCBS to the 1997 Census. Point estimates of the number of poor and poverty rates are shown in the table; because of small cluster sizes, confidence intervals for poverty rates are large and rates should, therefore, be seen as indicative.

18. However, the natural and acquired economic advantages of this region have been steadily eroded since late 2000. Progressively stricter mobility restrictions for people and vehicles have rendered the Israeli labor and commodity markets considerably less accessible since the *Intifada* began, and have drastically reduced the numbers of Israeli shoppers in local markets, aggravating the decline in income resulting from lost construction and agricultural employment across the Green Line in Israel. This has translated directly into reductions in the number of commercial establishments still in operation, lower profitability, and increased unemployment in service sector.

19. Although annual labor surveys provide limited disaggregated data on both economic activity and geographical area (and do not include cross-tabulations by place of residence, place of employment, and employment by sector), the decline in employment associated with the *Intifada* and the imposition of tighter closure, both internal and external, is clear. Of the 18,400 jobs lost from 2000 to 2002 in Jenin Governorate (plus the District of Tubas; annual surveys do not disaggregate further), the decline in construction accounted for 47.8 percent – 8,800 jobs. Agriculture witnessed the second largest drop (3,200), 17.4 percent of the total, while commerce accounted for 6.0 percent of the decline, shedding 1,100 jobs. (See table 8).

20. This loss of jobs has translated directly into increased unemployment rates. While in 1998 Jenin (and Tubas) already had unemployment rates above the overall rate for the West Bank, unemployment in these areas grew faster than average, and by 2002 the districts accounted for more than one-fifth (20.9 percent) of all of the West Bank unemployed while having only 12.7 percent of the working age population. The unemployment rate in Jenin/Tubas averaged 44.0 percent in 2002; for the rest of the West Bank it averaged 26.2 percent (with 28.2 percent for the West Bank as a whole). (See table 9, page 11.) If “discouraged workers” are included – that is, persons who because of their lack of employment prospects were not actively seeking work – “relaxed definition” unemployment rates rose to 47.6 percent in Jenin/Tubas in 2002. “Relaxed definition” unemployment in 2002 reached 30.0 percent in the rest of the West Bank, and 38.1 percent for the West Bank as a whole.

**Table 8: Employment by Industry and Residence of Worker, 1998-2001
Jenin Governorate and Tubas District**

Industry	Year	Jenin and Tubas		District
		Number	Percent	Share WB
Agriculture, hunting and	1998	15,300	27.3	29.1

fishing	1999	12,000	22.4	24.4
	2000	15,500	28.1	28.5
	2001	12,200	29.5	26.0
	2002	10,300	27.9	20.8
Mining , quarrying, and manufacturing	1998	6,400	11.4	9.5
	1999	4,900	9.2	7.1
	2000	4,900	8.9	7.4
	2001	3,100	7.6	5.3
Construction	2002	2,500	6.9	5.0
	1998	11,300	20.2	12.8
	1999	13,000	24.2	12.8
	2000	11,100	20.1	11.6
	2001	4,600	11.1	6.8
	2002	2,300	6.2	5.1
Commerce, hotels, and restaurants	1998	9,800	17.5	12.5
	1999	10,000	18.6	12.9
	2000	9,100	16.5	11.2
	2001	7,700	18.7	10.1
	2002	8,000	21.7	10.5
Transportation, storage , and communications	1998	2,100	3.7	10.4
	1999	1,800	3.3	9.2
	2000	2,000	3.6	9.3
	2001	1,700	4.2	8.0
	2002	2,000	5.4	9.4
Servicers and othe branches	1998	11,100	19.9	12.0
	1999	11,900	22.3	11.6
	2000	12,600	22.8	11.7
	2001	11,900	28.9	11.3
	2002	11,700	31.9	10.8
Total	1998	56,000	100.0	14.0
	1999	53,600	100.0	12.8
	2000	55,200	100.0	12.9
	2001	41,200	100.0	10.9
	2002	36,800	100.0	10.5

Source: Mission calculations on the basis of percentage distributions reported in PCBS, Annual Labor Surveys, 1998-2002.

**Table 9: Unemployment and “Discouraged Workers”, 1998-2001
Jenin Governorate and Tubas District**

Governorate		Unemployment			“Discouraged Workers” and “Relaxed Definition” Rate Governorate		
		Year	Number	Rate	Share W. B.	Number	Rate
Jenin Governorate and Tubas District	1998	7,500	11.8	14.9	7,600	21.2	12.1
	1999	7,500	12.3	17.1	5,400	19.4	12.5
	2000	10,700	16.2	18.3	5,800	22.9	14.2
	2001	23,500	36.3	22.0	5,200	41.0	17.1
West Bank	2002	28,900	44.0	20.9	4,500	47.6	15.5

1998	50,500	11.2	100.0	63,000	22.1	100.0
1999	43,900	9.5	100.0	59,400	19.7	100.0
2000	58,500	12.1	100.0	56,800	21.3	100.0
2001	106,800	22.1	100.0	62,200	31.0	100.0
2002	137,600	28.2	100.0	77,600	38.1	100.0

Source: Mission calculations on the basis of percentage distributions reported in PCBS, Annual Labor Surveys, 1998-2002.

21. It is reasonable to conclude that a considerable portion of the decline in employment of Jenin (and Tubas) residents was from lost employment across the Green Line in Israel. This conclusion is based on (i) the relatively heavy concentration of jobs lost in Jenin (and Tubas): 24.7 percent of the total jobs lost in the West Bank between 2000 and 2002 came from this region – a proportion greater than their population share; and (ii) the correlation between the type of employment lost by residents of this region and by West Bank workers in Israel. Almost two-thirds of the jobs lost by West Bank residents in Israel between 2000 and 2002 were in the construction sector – 32,200 jobs, compared to 2,700 in the agriculture sector. (See Table 10, following page.)

Table 10: Employment of West Bank Residents by Industry and Place of Employment, 1998-2001

Industry	Year	Working Within the West Bank			Working in Israel and Israeli Settlements		
		Number	Percent	Share WB	Number	Percent	Share WB
Agriculture, hunting, and fishing	1998	45,200	14.9	82.2	9,800	10.2	17.8
	1999	40,500	13.1	84.0	7,700	7.1	16.0
	2000	46,200	14.0	86.7	7,100	7.5	13.3
	2001	40,800	13.2	89.9	4,600	6.9	10.1
	2002	45,900	15.1	91.3	4,400	8.8	8.7
Mining, quarrying, and manufacturing	1998	56,100	18.5	83.9	10,800	11.3	16.1
	1999	54,400	17.6	79.0	14,500	13.4	21.0
	2000	53,800	16.3	82.3	11,600	12.2	17.7
	2001	48,200	15.6	83.0	9,900	14.8	17.0
	2002	42,600	14.0	82.4	9,100	18.2	17.6
Construction	1998	38,500	12.7	42.4	52,200	54.4	57.5
	1999	41,100	13.3	41.2	58,600	54.1	58.8
	2000	42,200	12.8	44.5	52,600	55.2	55.5
	2001	33,700	10.9	49.5	34,400	51.4	50.5
	2002	25,600	8.4	55.6	20,400	40.7	44.4
Commerce, hotels, and restaurants	1998	62,200	20.5	82.2	13,500	14.1	17.8
	1999	61,900	20.0	79.5	16,000	14.8	20.5
	2000	66,900	20.3	81.6	15,100	15.9	18.4
	2001	65,500	21.2	85.1	11,500	17.2	14.9
	2002	65,700	21.6	87.0	9,800	19.6	13.0
Transportation, storage, and communications	1998	17,900	5.9	93.2	1,300	1.4	6.8
	1999	17,600	5.7	89.3	2,100	1.9	10.7
	2000	20,100	6.1	92.2	1,700	1.8	7.8
	2001	20,400	6.6	94.4	1,200	1.8	5.6

	2002	19,800	6.5	94.3	1,200	2.4	5.7
Services and other branches	1998	83,400	27.5	90.9	8,300	8.6	9.1
	1999	93,700	30.3	90.9	9,400	8.7	9.1
	2000	100,600	30.5	93.5	7,000	7.4	6.5
	2001	100,400	32.5	95.0	5,300	7.9	5.0
	2002	104,700	34.4	95.3	5,200	10.3	4.7
Total	1998	303,200	100.0	76.0	96,000	100.0	24.0
	1999	309,300	100.0	74.1	108,300	100.0	25.9
	2000	329,800	100.0	77.6	95,200	100.0	22.4
	2001	309,100	100.0	82.2	66,900	100.0	17.8
	2002	304,200	100.0	85.9	50,100	100.0	14.1

Source: Mission calculations on the basis of percentage distributions reported in PCBS, Annual Labor Surveys, 1998-2002.

22. Although data on value added by sector are not available on a governorate basis, some indication of sectoral contribution to the Jenin Governorate's economy can be found in data on the number of private sector establishments and their employment by governorate. Table 11 (following page) illustrates the importance of agriculture to the economy of Jenin, with more than one-fourth of all West Bank private sector establishments in the agricultural sector (and their employment) located there.

Table 11: Jenin Governorate – Private Sector Establishments in Operation and Persons Engaged by Principal Economic Activity, 1997 and 2001

Principal Economic Activity	Year	Establishments			Persons Engaged		
		Number	Percent	Share WB	Number	Percent	Share WB
Agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing	1997	1,371	18.1	26.6	2,202	14.5	28.2
	2001	1,373	17.8	26.5	2,208	14.4	28.1
Mining and quarrying	1997	26	0.3	7.2	114	0.8	5.0
	2001	24	0.3	7.0	98	0.6	4.4
Manufacturing	1997	985	13.0	9.1	3,932	25.9	8.8
	2001	1,010	13.1	9.1	4,050	26.4	8.8
Electricity, gas, and water supply	1997	58	0.8	25.1	141	0.9	29.3
	2001	25	0.3	18.8	50	0.3	17.1
Construction	1997	22	0.3	7.2	66	0.4	3.0
	2001	11	0.1	4.7	45	0.3	1.5
Wholesale and retail trade (including vehicle repair)	1997	3,919	51.7	14.4	6,112	40.3	13.4
	2001	4,031	52.4	13.7	6,206	40.4	12.5
Hotels and restaurants	1997	274	3.6	14.4	469	3.1	10.9
	2001	278	3.6	13.1	470	3.1	8.1
Transport, storage, and communications	1997	36	0.5	9.5	68	0.4	3.3
	2001	34	0.4	8.4	147	1.0	2.8
Financial intermediation	1997	48	0.6	10.8	226	1.5	7.0
	2001	51	0.7	9.8	232	1.5	6.5
Real estate, renting, and business services	1997	229	3.0	11.9	404	2.7	8.4
	2001	233	3.0	11.1	413	2.7	7.5
Education	1997	109	1.4	10.8	468	3.1	6.0
	2001	104	1.4	9.9	450	2.9	4.8
Health and social work	1997	243	3.2	11.0	546	3.6	7.4
	2001	247	3.2	10.6	552	3.6	6.0
Other community, social,	1997	264	3.5	11.1	427	2.8	9.1

and personal services	2001	272	3.5	10.6	439	2.9	7.8
Total	1997	7,584	100.0	13.9	15,175	100.0	11.0
	2001	7,693	100.0	13.4	15,360	100.0	10.0
West Bank	1997	54,467		100.0	137,415		100.0
	2001	57,422		100.0	152,956		100.0

Source: PCBS, Establishment Census 1997 and unpublished data from PCBS, Establishment Census 2001.

23. As to other sectors, also somewhat over-represented are the number of establishments engaged in wholesale or retail trade (including automobile repair) – with this sector comprising over half of all private establishments in the governorate – and hotels and restaurants; this is indicative of the importance Israeli consumers played prior to the *Intifada*. However, employment in these establishments is limited, averaging only 1.6 employees, as most are very small-scale family-run businesses. Manufacturing enterprises, which after commercial enterprises engage the most residents of the governorate (approximately 4,000 persons), is also relatively small-scale – engaging 4.0 persons per enterprise.

24. With the tightening of closure and consequent economic deterioration, the number of enterprises in Jenin and the number of persons engaged per enterprise has declined, as elsewhere in the West Bank. In many respects, the construction of the barrier represents the ultimate form of external closure.

**Table 12: Jenin Governorate – Private Sector Establishments
in Operation, Permanently and Temporarily Closed, Selected Years**

	Year	Jenin Governorate			West Bank		
		In Operation	Perm. Closed	Temp. Closed	In Operation	Perm. Closed	Temp. Closed
Number of Establishments	1999	8,317	770	183	62,350	6,290	632
	2001	8,237	819	184	61,676	6,834	695
	2002	8,154	907	193	60,944	7,575	811
Percentage Change	1999-2001	-1.0	6.4	0.5	-1.1	8.6	10.0
	1999-2002	-2.0	17.8	5.5	-2.3	20.4	28.3
	2001-2002	-1.0	10.7	4.9	-1.2	10.8	16.7
Share of Jenin in West Bank	1999	13.3	12.2	29.0			
	2001	13.4	12.0	26.5			
	2002	13.4	12.0	23.8			

Source: PCBS, Establishment Census 1999, 2001, 2002.

25. The sectoral impact of the barrier's location and construction is concentrated on agriculture, and its full extent will only be revealed with time. While the relative intensity of the impact will vary by location and amount of lost land, its immediate effects include (i) the destruction of agricultural land and assets and water resources; (ii) inaccessibility to agricultural land and assets, including water resources; (iii) added limitations on the mobility of

people and goods, and therefore higher transactions costs; and (iv) uncertainty about the future and a consequent dampening of investment in economic activities generally, but especially in agriculture. Uncertainty poses particular dilemmas for agricultural producers – including whether to plant at all, the choice of crops to plant, the amount of investment to make in agricultural activities, and how to market the output in the face of movement restrictions.

Impact of the Barrier on Population Migration

26. The May 2003 LACC report recommended that monitoring work continue in order “to assess the probability and potential magnitude of migration from communities severely compromised” by the barrier and to ascertain whether “migration is likely to become a significant factor in the evolving history” of the barrier. The following case study examines villages situated in the last 5 km of Phase I construction and along the barrier’s trajectory in Phase II, areas that were not focused upon in the earlier report (which concentrated on the Qalqiliya and Tulkarm Governorates).

27. In the area under current investigation, the barrier deviates from the Green Line into the West Bank by up to about half a kilometre.¹³ No villages lie between the Green Line and the barrier. Total access to social services (e.g., health, education) was not lost as a result of barrier construction in these areas, although access difficulties associated with the general closure policy often made movement problematic. In no village did the team learn of individuals that had moved from their villages in search of opportunity elsewhere in the West Bank: those interviewed reasoned that the economic situation was much the same throughout the Jenin area the entire West Bank.¹⁴

28. For the purpose of this study, the term “population migration” is defined as the movement, not necessarily permanent, of either individuals or entire families due to various consequences of the barrier’s construction. The study identified four types of migration for consideration:

- a. Migration of individuals or families from their places of residence due to damage to or complete destruction of these residences;
- b. Migration of either individuals or families possessing Israeli identification from the West Bank to Israel;
- c. Attempted migration of individuals or families to or from those areas believed to fall in between the barrier and the Green Line;
- d. Movement of traders to those areas in close proximity to planned terminals in the barrier, the purpose of which would be to facilitate the flow of goods between the West Bank and Israel.¹⁵

29. Migration Resulting from Damage to or Destruction of Places of Residence.

¹³ A patrol road attached to the barrier apparatus in At Tayba is located further inside the West Bank.

¹⁴ The villages studied were ‘Anin, At Tayba, Rummana, Al Jalama, Zububa, Faqqu’a and Jalbun. Field research was conducted between 7--17 July 2003.

¹⁵ Telephone interview with Rachel Nidek Askenazi, Spokeswoman for Israel’s Ministry of Defence, 16 July 2003. The spokeswoman explained that the five terminals would “operate in a similar way to the Karni crossing, but in a more modern way.” She also explained that there are plans for approximately forty gates through which farmers will be able to access their land. Plans have also been made for the construction of approximately thirteen gates to allow for the passage of pedestrians and cars between Israel and the West Bank.

This type of migration was witnessed only in At Tayba, at two separate locations located one kilometer apart, yet involving one particular clan, the Aghbarias.

30. Location 1:¹⁶ A 245 square meter residence housing four brothers, Khaled, Fathi, Latilla and Mohammed Aghbaria, and their families (fifteen people in total) was destroyed in February 2003 after a landslide caused by extensive dynamiting for the construction of a patrol road¹⁷ leading into the primary barrier apparatus. The Palestinian Hydrology Group visited the site, and declared both the house and the seven dunums of land on which it is situated uninhabitable.¹⁸ According to Mohammed Jabarin, head of the At Tayba Village Council, deterioration of the property occurred over a fifteen day period. Large cracks, the length of entire walls and 2-3 inches wide, are now visible throughout the entire structure. A neighbouring house was not affected but its occupants were told three months ago by the Palestinian Hydrology Group to evacuate for fear that their residence was also unsafe to inhabit.

31. The house was built in 1970, and the family claimed to have obtained the necessary permits to build (although this could not be verified). The Government of Israel has not thus far offered the families compensation, and the latter did not pursue any legal avenues. Each family is now living elsewhere; some live in the local school, while others reside with neighbours. The barrier has also impacted the clan in other ways. Prior to barrier construction, the sum total of the family holdings in this area amounted to 50 dunums. Forty-three dunums are now situated beyond the barrier, and cannot be accessed.¹⁹

32. Location 2:²⁰ The second location consists of three dwellings, identified here as Houses A, B and C.

33. *House A*: A 100 square meter one-story structure, standing approximately 25 meters away from the barrier, was demolished in February 2003 after one week's verbal advance notice. At the time, the barrier in this particular area was under construction. The house was occupied by Adul Nasser Aghbaria (the fifth brother), who now lives in House C, the home of his parents (his father, Fathi Aghbaria, is a refugee from Umm Al- Fahm). The border of his former home now sits beyond the barrier apparatus.

34. *House B*: A 180 square meter two-story structure standing approximately 15 meters from the barrier was demolished in May 2003 with one week's verbal notice. At the time, the barrier in this area was 90% complete.²¹ The residence housed the brothers Assad and Mahmoud Aghbaria. The latter

¹⁶ Based upon a field visit and an oral interview conducted at the site with Mohammed Jabarin, head of the At Tayba Village Council, both on July 8, 2003.

¹⁷ The patrol road is approximately 700-1000 meters inside the West Bank.

¹⁸ This also calls into question the safety of a school sitting at the base of the mountain. The school was completed in 2001 with funds provided by the OPEC Fund. The World Bank administered the project.

¹⁹ While the land sitting east of the fence was not farmed, it constituted the sole capital holding of the clan in this area.

²⁰ Based upon a field visit and oral interviews conducted at the site with Mohammed Jabarin, head of the At Tayba Village Council, Fathi Aghbaria, head of the Aghbaria clan, and his son Assad, all on July 9, 2003.

²¹ The distance between Houses A and B is approximately 50m. Assuming that the destruction of both houses was due to immediate security concerns, it begs the questions as to why the houses were not demolished at the same time.

lived there with his pregnant wife and son. Assad now lives in House C; Mahmoud took advantage of his Israeli ID (obtained by marrying his wife, born in Umm Al-Fahm) and moved the family to Umm Al-Fahm.

35. *House C*: At the same time that House B was being destroyed, the IDF verbally informed the clan that House C would be demolished by the end of the year.²² The owner, Fathi Aghbaria, said that the family will move into At Taybe and rent an apartment if the house is demolished.

36. Prior to barrier construction, location 2 consisted of 13 dunums of land on which the family holdings sat. About a half of the land now lies to the west of the barrier; access to the land (on which there are approximately 150 olive trees) is now forbidden.²³ The remaining family land, to the east, lies within 50 meters of the barrier. The IDF has told the clan that movement within 100 meters of the barrier is forbidden, and it is thus unclear how long the clan will have access to the remainder of their land. The family consulted a law firm in Umm Al-Fahm, and were advised that nothing could be done as the clan possessed no valid written evidence. All IDF declarations were issued verbally, and it was unlikely that the clan obtained formal building permits for the structures.²⁴

37. Barrier construction has impacted the family in other ways. Fathi Aghbaria is a diabetic who travels to Umm Al-Fahm every three to five days for treatment.²⁵ In the absence of the barrier, he was able to cross into Israel without problem. Now he is obliged to travel to Umm Al-Fahm via Tulkarm, a trip that takes anywhere between three to six hours.²⁶ Previously, travel time totalled ten to fifteen minutes. The costs of travel have also risen. Prior to barrier construction, he paid approximately NIS 20 for the round trip to Umm Al-Fahm. He is currently paying approximately NIS 200.

38. **Migration to Israel using Israeli IDs²⁷**. This phenomenon was found in the following villages: Al Jalama, Rummana, At Tayba, 'Anin and Zububa.²⁸ Most have "sister villages" across the Green Line with whom inter-marriage was frequent. In all cases a significant percentage of those with Israeli IDs crossed into Israel once barrier construction began. The figures provided in

²² Assad Aghbaria claimed that "soldiers of a high rank" informed the family of the impending demolition.

²³ Revenue from the olive trees can be calculated at 1 tree = USD 10, or approximately USD 1500 per year.

²⁴ Clan members built each structure. When asked whether permits had been obtained for their construction, Assad Aghbaria claims that in 1995, Israeli authorities sent inspectors to the clan to ascertain that their structures were not infringing upon Israeli state land. The inspectors gave no indication that the structures were illegally built. Most of those questioned throughout the period of research expressed hesitancy at pursuing legal avenues against barrier construction and the requisition of their land. For example, head of the Rummana Village Council Anis Tawfiq al-Emor explained that a legal option was not considered as it was felt that an Israeli court would rule in favour of GOI on security grounds, and this would, in his opinion, grant the barrier further legitimacy, Oral interview with al-Emor, head of the Rummana Village Council, Rummana, July 8, 2003.

²⁵ He is obliged to travel to Umm Al-Fahm for this treatment since he is covered by Israeli health insurance.

²⁶ On one occasion, IDF soldiers in the vicinity allowed him to cross a gate in the barrier. Presently the gate is used to allow the movement of IDF and other security vehicles. It is unclear whether this gate constitutes an agricultural crossing.

²⁷ Unless otherwise stated, all figures are approximate and are based on oral interviews with the various heads of Village Councils.

²⁸ Israeli IDs can either take the form of citizenship or of residency status. A "Family Reunification" scheme began after June 1967, and enabled Israelis who married Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza to apply for legal status for their spouse so the latter was able to reside in Israel and/or apply for Israeli citizenship. The law was suspended in May 2002. A bill passed in the Knesset today, July 31, abolished the practice.

Table 13 constitute a “best estimate” by those heads of Village Councils questioned.

Table 13: Migration by Israeli ID Holders

Village	Population mid-2003 ²⁹	Israeli Villages with which Intermarriage Occurs	Approximate no. of Israeli ID Holders Prior to Commencement of Barrier Construction	Approximate no. Remaining after Barrier Construction Began
Al Jalama	2,177	Sandala; Mqeibleh	70 men	25 men
Rummana	3,186	Salem	50 men	10 men
At Tayba	2,254	Umm Al-Fahm	Between 80-100	Between 2-3
'Anin	3,514	No sister village	Between 1-2 men	0
Zububa	2,007	Umm Al-Fahm	15 men	0

39. There are several factors to note when examining the Table 13: (i) Most Village Council heads were reluctant to comment on any population migration for fear that migration may jeopardize holdings (plots of land, houses) in the villages left behind. The stigma associated with leaving the villages themselves was another factor; (ii) A fear of losing the benefits associated with possession of Israeli IDs because of non-residency in Israel may have been a motivating factor for those holding Israeli IDs to move into Israel on a more permanent basis.³⁰ Those heads of Village Councils interviewed, however, were adamant that the definitive moment for population migration occurred once barrier construction began. The figures below reflect this trend; (iii) Unless otherwise stated, the figures provided concern the male populations in the West Bank villages. Figures for female members of the villages who married men from Israeli Arab villages were not a consideration for the Village Council heads, as women were obliged to leave their families in the West Bank and live with the husband’s family across the Green Line, irrespective of the barrier or its construction; (iv) The large number of villagers with Israeli IDs reflects ongoing ties between West Bank villages sitting close to the Green Line, and Israeli Arab villages. Residents of At Tayba, for example, have a strong history of inter-marriage with the inhabitants of Umm Al-Fahm.

40. Migration to/from Areas Falling between the Barrier and the Green Line³¹.

Attempts to do this were found in one instance, in the village of At Tayba. While the entire village is now east of the barrier, rumours circulated throughout the second half of 2002 that the village would be wedged between the barrier and the Green Line.³²

Approximately fifty people from outside the village have attempted to register

²⁹Figures obtained from *Small Area Population, 1997 – 2010*, Palestinian Bureau of Statistics.

³⁰ Zububa’s Village Council head Mohammed Jaradat reported that eighteen months ago villagers with Israeli IDs received notices through the mail, delivered to their Israeli addresses, that warned of possible revocation of benefits associated with possession of Israeli IDs if the addressee continued living in the West Bank. Existence of this letter has not been confirmed. Oral interview with Jaradat, Zububa, July 17, 2003.

³¹ Oral interview with At Tayba’s head of the Village Council, Mohammed Jabarin, At Tayba, July 9, 2003.

³² It is our opinion that this was due to incorrectly interpreting a map provided to the village by the IDF showing the trajectory of the barrier. A depth barrier, however, is reportedly planned for the area. B’tselem reports that maps provided to the organization by Israel’s Ministry of Defence, and displaying approved trajectories, reflect the possibility of a depth barrier.

themselves as At Tayba residents in the second half of 2002 and in 2003, believing that if the barrier did fall east of the village, permits to enter Israel would become readily accessible. None were successful. No migration of households from areas between the barrier and the Green Line into the West Bank was reported.

41. Movement of Traders to Areas in Proximity to Planned Gates in the Barrier³³. Prior to the commencement of field research, it was theorized that traders might be willing to re-establish their businesses in areas of close proximity to planned terminals in the barrier. According to *Ha'aretz*, and confirmed by the Ministry of Defence, five terminals will be constructed -- in the areas of Al Jalama, Taibeh, Tarkumiye, Atarot, and the eastern ring road in the south (north of Gush Etzion).³⁴ Our research focused on Al Jalama where, according to the Village Council head, Khaled Abu Farha, eleven dunums have been cleared for possible terminal construction.

42. Abu Farha estimated that fifteen new stores have opened in Al Jalama in 2003. He further estimated that fifteen stores opened in 2002, while none opened in 2001. All numbers are approximate, as new businesses do not automatically register with village authorities -- many do not in order to avoid paying taxes. Thus there is no accurate registry of new business owners in Al Jalama.

43. Shop owners who had opened businesses in the last month were interviewed.³⁵

These rejected the idea that they had opened because of the planned Al Jalama terminal, indicating that they were providing for the Israeli-Arab clientele who make up at least 90% of consumers in Al Jalama. The team felt that the notion that traders are reestablishing themselves in Al Jalama in preparation for a terminal was unfounded at this stage. It should be noted that the traders interviewed were sceptical that a terminal will actually be built.

44. Conclusions. Population migration as a consequence of barrier construction in the northern West Bank is occurring, but at very low levels. Migration to Israel of males with Israeli IDs was the most common type of population movement found, and was generally initiated once construction began in earnest. Rumours of future construction have thus far not induced population movement. Unsuccessful attempts to migrate to areas anticipated to fall between the barrier and the Green Line were also noted. While property requisitioning or destruction resulting in population migration has occurred, thus far this also appears infrequent.

The Israeli Debate over the "Separation Fence"³⁶

³³ Unless otherwise stated, information based upon an oral interview with Khaled Abu Farha, head of the Al Jalama Village Council, July 7, 2003.

³⁴ Zohar Blumenkrantz, "300-dunum Crossing Planned for Taibeh," and "First Border Crossi"³⁴ Zububa's Village Council head Mohammed Jaradat reported that eighteen months ago villagers with Israeli IDs received notices through the mail, delivered to their Israeli addresses, that warned of possible revocation of benefits associated with possession of Israeli IDs if the addressee continued living in the West Bank. Existence of this letter has not been confirmed. Oral interview with Jaradat, Zububa, July 17, 2003.

³⁵ Those questioned managed roadside stores and had previously operated out of an established strip of businesses along the main road. All were demolished two years ago, however, following a terrorist attack in the area.

³⁶ In Israeli discourse, the barrier is described as the "Separation Fence." For this reason, hereafter, it will be referred to as such.

45. Three prevailing arguments are being used in support for the fence. Security

requirements and the success of other fences, notably the Blue Line fence along Israel's frontier with Lebanon and the fence surrounding the Gaza Strip are noted, as are Israel's demographic concerns. Some advocates claim that the latter requires physical separation between Israelis and Palestinians. It is also argued that the fence does not constitute a final border and is therefore open to discussion during final status negotiations.

46. Discourse on the fence within Israeli society, at both governmental and popular levels, is notable for the degree of support the fence receives across Israel's political spectrum. According to Ma'ariv, public support for the fence currently stands at 68 percent.³⁷

47. As the debate on the fence has gathered momentum, the fence's route has emerged as a major point of contention in Israel. The trajectories advanced by different parties have ranged from a fence that adheres to the Green Line to one that includes various settlement blocs. Some argue for a fence that is short, and hence more defensible; others, such as many members of Israeli Regional Councils throughout the West Bank, advocate a fence that cuts more deeply into the West Bank.³⁸

- (i) 48. Maj.-Gen (res) Uzi Dayan, head of the Public Council for the Construction of the Security Fence, noted that until construction is finished, "all the fence does is funnel terrorists and car thieves into Israeli areas not yet sealed off."³⁹ Suspicions of true agendas are expressed in some of the accounts of the debate on speed and choice of alignment.⁴⁰ After the shooting attack at the edge of the Qalqiliya fence in June 2003, the structure's effectiveness was also questioned. Critics claimed that the fence provides only a "calming illusion of security" and is not a "magical solution that will produce absolute quiet."⁴¹

³⁷ *Ma'ariv* – Gal Hadash poll, released July 4, 2003.

³⁸ For example, Maj.-Gen (res.) Danny Rothschild, the president of the Council for Peace and Security, asked "why is it necessary to put up 600 kilometers of fence in order to bring more Palestinian population into our territory? This will make the project more expensive, delay it and demand of the IDF to allocate a great deal of manpower to guarding the fence." Mazal Mualem, "Fence-sitting," *Ha'aretz*, May 30, 2003.

Pinhas Wallerstein, head of the Binyamin Regional Council, has admitted visiting IDF commanders to persuade each of the virtues of including the "Talmonim bloc," settlements northwest of Ramallah, to the west of the barrier. Meron Rappaport, "Fences and Facts," *Yedioth Ahronoth*, May 23, 2003.

³⁹ Erik Schechter, "Separation Anxiety," *Jerusalem Post*, June 19, 2003.

⁴⁰ Mazal Mualem has written extensively on this subject for *Ha'aretz*. See, for example, "Fence in a Fog," 11 July 2003; "Logistics Chief: No Delay on the Fence," June 16, 2003; "Fence-sitting," May 30, 2003;

⁴¹ Sever Plotzker, "A Fence, Not a Wall," *Yedioth Ahronoth*, June 19, 2003; Amir Rappaport, "The Fence and the Disappointment," *Ma'ariv*, June 19, 2003.